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[Crim. No. 7835. In Bank. June 25, 1964.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT 
EARL MATTESON, Defendant and Appellant. 
{1J Oriminal Law-Evidence-Writings for Oomparison.-An ex-
emplar of defendant's handwriting and expert testimony based 
thereon were erroneously admitted into evidence where de-
fendant made the exemplar immediately after making a state-
ment the trial court ruled was coerced; that the coerced 
exemplar did not fan within the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation did not save it. 
[2J Id.-Appea,l-Reversible Error - Evidence - Admissions and 
Oonfessions.-The introduction of defendant's coerced admis-
sion was reversible error despite the fact that the court, on 
defendant's objection, ordered the statement stricken and ad-
monished the jury to disregard it, since it cannot be presumed 
that the jurors could erase from their minds such relevant and 
strongly probative evidence. (Overruling and disapproving 
[1) Admissibility in evidence, for purpose of comparison, of 
writing made by accused person at request of public authorities, 
note, 1 A.L.R. 1304. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 193; Am.Jur., 
Evidence (1st ed § 742). 
:MeX. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 545; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 1382(27). 
) 
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PeopZe v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237,256-257 [205 P. 435] and Peo-
pZe v. Andrus, 159 Cal.App.2d 673, 681-682 [324 P.2d 617] 
insofar as they are inconsistent.) 
APPEAL from a judgmcnt of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John F. Aiso, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for forgery. Judgment of conviction reversed. 
Robert Earl Matteson, in pro. per., and Kate Whyner, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As-
sistant Attorney General, and S. Clark Moore, Deputy At-
torney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of 
four counts of forgery. (Pen. Code, § 470.) 
Defendant, an employee of the O. K. Roof Sales and Ser-
vice Corporation, was named as the payee on two payroll 
checks of the corporation. Ray Parmerter, who was not an 
employee, was named as tIle payee on two other such checks, 
one of which was endorsed to defendant. Officers of the cor-
poration authorized to sign checks testified that they had not 
signed the checks or authorized anyone else to sign them and 
that the checks were missing from the corporation's check-
book. Witnesses who cashed the checks identified defendant 
as the person who presented three of them and as accompany-
ing Parmerter when he presented the fourth. According to a 
police handwriting expert, defendant's endorsements, the 
amounts, dates, and drawer's signatures, and three of the 
payees' names were written by the same person. The expert 
also testified that all of this writing matched a handwriting 
exemplar made by defendant for the police. 
Officer C. W. Rogers of the Los Angeles Police Department 
interrogated defendant after his arrest. The officer testified 
that defendant claime<t that he found the checks in his auto-
mobile completely made out and that he freely and vol-
untarily admitted that he endorsed three of them and knew 
that they "were not any good" when he endorsed and cashed 
them. After this interview, Officer Rogers took defendant 
to another room to make tIle handwriting exemplar relied 
upon by the police expert. No objection was made to Officer 
) 
) 
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Rogers' testimony, but on cross-examination, he testified thai>; 
before defendant made the statement and the exemplar, de- -, 
fendant and Officer Rogers' partner, Officer Ernest Eldridge, ,; 
left the room for a short time. Upon their return, Officer 
Rogers asked defendant if Officer Eldridge had hit him; de-
fendant replied affirmatively, but said that "he didn't hit 
very hard. " 
Defendant testified that he was taken from his cell by 
Officer Rogers and Officer Eldridge for interrogation. When 
he repeatedly refused to make a handwriting exemplar until 
he had seen counsel, Officer Eldridge kicked him in the shins 
and pulled his hair. Officer Eldridge then took him into a 
side room and struck him in the midsection with sufficient 
force to knock him into a chair. While continuing to demand 
that defendant make a handwriting exemplar, Officer Eld-
ridge struck him several more times in the midsection and 
asked if he would like "the rubber llOse treatment." De-
fendant tllen "decided to avoid any further punishment or 
abuse at his hands or some other officer's hands that I would 
make this handwriting exemplar and carryon this conver-
sation." He returned to Officer Rogers' desk, made the 
statement that he knew the c11ecks "were not any good" 
when he endorsed and cashed them, and went alone with 
Officer Rogers to another room to make tlle exemplar. 
A cell mate corroborated defendant's testimony that de-
fendant's right midsection was bruised and discolored the 
morning after the interrogation. Officer Rogers testified in 
rebuttal that he was occupied with papers when Officer Eld-
ridge first tried to get defendant's exemplar and saw no 
kicking or hair pulling, that defendant and Officer Eldridge 
were gone for only two or three minutes, that defendant did 
not appear to be in pain when they returned, and that he did 
not appear to be frightened when he made his statement and 
exemplar. Officer Rogers also stated that Officer Eldridge was 
on vacation and not ayailable to testify. 
After this testimony, defense counsel moved to strike Offi-
cer Rogers' testimony concerning defendant's statement on 
the ground that i! was im·oluntary. The trial judge granted 
the motion and. instructed the jury to disregard "the oral 
conversation that relates to the guilt or innocence, or any 
knowledge that pertains to tIle guilt or innocence ... " of 
defendant. The court overruled' a similar objection to the 
Ilandwriting exemplar on the grounds that a handwriting 
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against self-incrimination and that defendant was no longer 
under duress or compulsion when he made the exemplar. 
[1] The court erred in admitting tlle exemplar and the 
expert testimony based thereon. The conclusion that the ex-
emplar was not made under duress is not consistent with the 
uncontradicted evidence and the court's finding regarding 
defendant's statement. (See People v. Underwood, ante, 
pp. 113, 120-121 (37 Ca1.Rptr. 313, 389 P.2d 937] ; People v. 
Trout, 54 Ca1.2d 576, 583 I6 Cal.Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231, 80 
A.L.R2d 1418]; People v. Berve, 51 Ca1.2d 286, 290 [332 
P.2d 97].) The court ruled that defendant's statement was 
coerced by the brutal treatment by Officer Eldridge. De-
fendant made the exemplar immediately after his statement 
under threat of the same coercion. Officer Eldridge demanded 
only a handwriting exemplar and inflicted the punisIlment to 
get it. Although Officer Eldridge was no longer present when 
defendant made the exemplar, t1le coercion that induced the 
statt'ment also induced the exemplar. 
Evidence obtained by the state from a defendant by bru-
tality is not admissible against him. (Rockin v. State of 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 190-
191, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396, 1403].) It is irrelevant that a hand-
"'riting exemplar does not fall within the privilege against 
Helf-incrimination; the rule of the Rochin ease is a rule of 
exclusion, Rlld the fact that the evidence does not fall within 
other exclusionary rules does not save it. 
[2] Whether the admission of the exemplar was harmless 
error (see People v. Parham, 60 Ca1.2d 378, 386 "[33 Cal. 
Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001]) need not be considered, for de-
fendant's conviction must be reversed because of the intro-
duction of his involuntary statement. The introduction of an 
involuntary confession or admission requires reversal of a 
judgment of conviction despite defE'ndant's failure to object 
to its introduction (People v. Underwood, supra, ante, 
pp. 113, 120, 126; People v. Millllm, 42 Ca1.2d 524, 526-527 
[267 P.2d 1039]) and rE'gardlE'Ss of other e"idence of guilt 
(People v. Brommel, 56 Ca1.2d 629, 634 [15 Ca1.Rptr. 909, 
364 P.2d 845] ; People v. Trout, supra, 54 Cal.2d 576,585). 
This defect ip the trial was not cured by the court's strik-
ing the evidence and admonislling the jury to disregard it. 
Ordinarily the admission of inepmpetellt evidence cannot be 
curt'd by striking it lind instruetillg the jury to disregard it 
when it gOE'S to a mllin issue of the case and when other 
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evidence of guilt is not clear and convincing. (People v~; 
Hardy, 33 Ca1.2d 52, 61-62 [198 P.2d 865] ; People v. Roof" 
216 Cal.App.2d 222, 226-227 [30 Cal.Rptr. 619].) In cases ,i 
involYing involuntary statements of the accused, however, the 
weight of other evidence of guilt is not considered. Incrim-·· 
inating statements from defendant's own tongue are most 
persuasive evide11ce of his guilt, and the part they play in 
securing a conviction cannot be determined. (See People v. 
Parham, supra, 60 Cal.2d378, 385.) For the same reason, an 
admonition or an instruction to the jury to disregard in-
voluntary incriminating statements does not cure the er-
roneous admission of such statements. (See Jones v. State, 
184 Wis. 50, 54 [198 N.W. 598); Ward v. State, 117 Miss. 
847, 853 [78 So. 7821 ; cr. People Y. Hardy, supra, 33 Cal.2d 
52, 61-62; Olil~er v. United States, 202 F.2d 521, 523; People "'\". 
Y. Street, 288 Mich. 406, 409 [284 N.W. 926] ; State v. Leaks, 
124 N.J.L. 261, 264 [10 A.2d 281]. But see Temple v. State, 
245 Ind. - [195 N.E.2d 850, 853-854J ; Harris v. State (Tex. ! 
Crim. App.) 375 S.W.2d 310, 311; (If. Goldsmith v. United 
States, 277 F.2d 335, 342 (semble); State v. Robinson, 238 
S.C. 140, 165 [119 S.E.2d 671J.) The offense charged against 
defendant is committed by presenting for payment a check 
known to be false or forged with intent to defraud. (E.g., 
People v. Smith, 103 Cal. 563, 565 [37 P. 516] ; People v . 
• Tones, 210 Cal.App.2d 805, 807 [27 Cal.Rptr. 35J ; People v. 
Chapman, 156 Cal.App.2d 151, 156 [319 P.2d 8].) He admit-
ted under coercion tllat he knew that the checks were no good 
when he endorsed and cashed them. It cannot be presumed 
that the jurors could erase such relevant and strongly proba-
tive evidence from their minds. 
Insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, People 
v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 256-257 [205 P. 435,24 A.L.R. 1383], 
and People v. Andrus, 159 Cal.App.2d 673, 681-682 [324 P.2d 
617], are overruled and disapproved. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., eon-
curred. 
Schauer, {., concurred in the judgment. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for 
the reasons expressed by ~fr. .Tustice Files in the opinion 
prE'pared by him for tIl(' Distl'ict Court of Appeal in People 
v. Matteson (Cal.App.) 36 CaJ.Rptr. 373. 
